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RECALLING THE LAWYERS: THE NHTSA, GM,
AND THE CHEVROLET COBALT
Bernard W. Bell*
INTRODUCTION
The legal community has debated lawyers’ roles and responsibilities in
the criminal and civil litigation context, but devoted considerably less
attention to such issues in administrative practice. Agency adjudication
often resembles civil litigation, suggesting a similar role for lawyers in
those agency processes. But many lawyers advise corporations on
regulatory compliance issues.
Financial scandals have ignited a vibrant debate over lawyers’ role as
gatekeepers securing regulatory compliance. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has long emphasized transactional attorneys’ critical
compliance role.1 Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”) addressed the SEC’s authority over lawyers.2 One
sponsor observed that when “executives and/or accountants are breaking the
law, you can be sure that” their counsel “are not doing their jobs”;3 “[o]ne
of the most critical responsibilities that those lawyers have is, when they see
something occurring or about to occur that violates the law, . . . they must
act as an advocate for the shareholders, for the company itself, for the
investors.”4
Section 307 directed the SEC to issue rules “for the protection of
investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the [SEC] in any way in the
representation of issuers.”5 The rules were to require attorneys to “report
up” securities infractions or breaches of fiduciary duty to the company’s

* Professor of Law and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Rutgers Law School (Newark Campus).
I am grateful to Donna Dennis, Douglas S. Eakeley, John Leubsdorf, and Laurel S. Terry for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article is part of a larger colloquium
entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State held at Fordham University School of Law. For
an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword: Lawyering in the
Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016).
1. See Emanuel Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, 45 SEC Docket 262, 266 n.20
(June 18, 1973); accord SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541–42 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012).
3. 148 CONG. REC. S6551 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
4. Id. at S6552.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
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General Counsel or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and, if necessary, its
audit committee or board of directors.6
The SEC promulgated rules giving content to section 307’s “reporting
up” requirement7 (“Sarbox rules”), asserting jurisdiction over a sizable
swath of legal practice through its broad definition of the phrase “appearing
and practicing” before the SEC.8 It also proposed a “reporting out”
requirement, namely the “noisy withdrawal” rule.9 If responsible corporate
officers failed to take reasonable remedial steps, the lawyer had to (a)
withdraw from the representation, indicating that the withdrawal was due to
“professional considerations,” and (b) advise the SEC of any materially
false or misleading statement in any SEC filing the attorney had assisted in
preparing.10 After receiving unfavorable comments,11 the SEC revised its
proposal to provide that upon an attorney’s withdrawal for “professional
considerations,” the company would have to report the withdrawal.12
Imposing compliance obligations on securities lawyers is somewhat
consistent with ensuring proper representation of their “clients.” The client,
the corporate entity, includes several groups of “constituents,” one of which
is the shareholders.13 Obligations to ensure that companies do not make
material misstatements in SEC submissions do not necessarily conflict with
counsel’s obligations to the corporation in general, or the shareholders in
particular. Indeed, section 307 counteracts the pressure on corporate
counsel to pursue management’s interests at other constituencies’
expense.14 However, Sarbox rules provide protections to at least one
group—investors—not conventionally recognized as constituents of the
corporate client.

6. Id.
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–.7 (2016); see Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205
(2014)).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a); see Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6297–98.
9. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg.
71,670, 71,688–91 (Dec. 2, 2002) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2014)); see Roger C.
Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV.
725, 810–14 (2004).
10. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at
71688–91.
11. Implementation of Professional Standards for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6324–25
(noting that many commenters argued that the rule exceeded the SEC’s authority, conflicted
with long-standing state ethics rules, and would cause clients to keep information from their
lawyers).
12. Id. at 6324, 6326 & n.40 (discussing proposed section 205.3(e)).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). Indeed, a
“corporation” is merely a proxy for its constituent groups’ collective interests. William H.
Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of
Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 89 (2003).
14. Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the
Lawyer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 62 BUS. LAW. 427, 434 (2007).
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But discussions of lawyers’ gatekeeping roles have rarely expanded
beyond the securities context.15 The last fifteen years have produced
scandals involving manufacturers’ failure to recall defective motor vehicles
or equipment, such as the Ford/Firestone rollover problems, the Toyota
unintended acceleration problem, the Cobalt ignition switch defect, and the
Takata airbag defect.16 Product safety provides a context outside of
securities law in which to consider lawyers’ regulatory compliance
responsibilities. Because consumers are not “constituents” of the lawyer’s
organizational client,17 the congruence between the lawyer’s organizational
client and regulatory beneficiaries in the securities area does not exist in the
field of product safety. Nevertheless, the physical harms that may befall
consumers are far more serious than the financial losses shareholders
typically suffer.
This Article summarizes product safety and vehicle safety law and
recounts General Motors Company’s (GM) response to the Cobalt ignition
switch defect, paying particular attention to the actions of GM’s in-house
and outside counsel. This Article then considers the legality and prudence
of a regulatory agency’s imposition of gatekeeping responsibilities on such
counsel.
I. PRODUCT AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
Product safety lies at the intersection of civil justice and regulation.
Products liability law provides a damages remedy to those injured by
defective products.18
Such cases are generally brought against a
corporation, almost invariably the product manufacturer, and ordinarily do
not turn on identifying the individuals responsible for the defect.19 Critics
have asserted that products liability law imposes excessive and crippling
liability on manufacturers.20
Products liability litigation is retrospective, seeking to allocate losses
attributable to defective products rather than to remedy defects before they
cause injury.21 And, like all civil litigation, it is lawyer focused. Lawyers
possess the primary responsibility for conducting the litigation;22 the
15. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules
Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455 (2006).
16. See 2 RICHARD M. GOODMAN ET AL., AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY §§ 6:102,
6:104, 6:106.50 (3d ed. 2015).
17. But see Simon, supra note 13, at 101 (including customers among corporate
constituencies).
18. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.1, at 3 (2005).
19. “Fault,” particularly of specific individuals, is generally irrelevant in strict products
liability cases. See, e.g., id. § 5.9, at 319.
20. See, e.g., Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956,
104th Cong. §§ 2(a)(4)–(7) (2d Sess. 1996) (enacted and vetoed); OWEN, supra note 18,
§ 1.3, at 24–25.
21. OWEN, supra note 18, § 10.8, at 726–27.
22. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. (the litigator controls the means of
litigation and “need not pursue objectives or employ means simply because a client may
wish that the lawyer do so”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2013); Zacharias, supra note 15, at 455–56.
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lawyer is the intermediary through which the client acts. Lawyers’ conduct
in civil litigation is generally the business of state bar disciplinary
authorities or, in the case of federal suits, the federal courts.
Several federal agencies also have jurisdiction over product safety, most
notably the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC), the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Food
and Drug Administration23 (FDA). Regulated entities have reporting
requirements designed to enable agencies to detect product defects. The
administrative process provides for product recalls and mandated product
warnings designed to remedy defects or at least warn users of dangers.
Several agencies can order recalls themselves or encourage and monitor
manufacturers’ voluntary recalls.24 Most recalls are voluntary to some
degree with the regulated entity initiating the recall, albeit sometimes at the
regulatory agency’s suggestion.25
With respect to the reporting and recall requirements, lawyers generally
do not operate as litigators, particularly when the regulated entity decides
not to raise an issue with regulators. The NHTSA, the CPSC, and the FDA
generally regulate corporations engaged in a particular field, but not
lawyers’ professional conduct in providing regulatory advice.
The National Highway Transportation Safety Act (“the Highway Safety
Act”) grants the NHTSA authority to specify safety standards for motor
vehicles as well as order recalls. While the NHTSA has promulgated a
number of safety standards, the agency primarily relies on the recall process
to address vehicle safety issues.26 Manufacturers initiate most vehicle
recalls.27 The Highway Safety Act and its implementing regulations require
motor vehicle manufacturers to notify the NHTSA within five working days
of discovering a safety “defect” in its vehicles,28 i.e., a defect that creates an
“unreasonable risk of accidents or injuries,” and recall the vehicles to
remedy the defect.29
The manufacturer must remedy the defect without charge by either
repairing or replacing the vehicle, or refunding the purchase price (less
depreciation).30
Thus, if a manufacturer orders a recall without
understanding the defect or the means of repair, it incurs an obligation to
replace the vehicle or refund the purchase price.31 This might well entail
extraordinary expense, making recalling a motor vehicle before determining
23. OWEN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 2–3.
24. See, e.g., id. § 10.8, at 760 n.35; Andrew S. Krulwich, Recalls: Legal and
Corporate Responses to FDA, CPSC, NHTSA, and Product Liability Considerations, 39
BUS. LAW. 757 (1984).
25. 2 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 6:3; Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, 2013 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 359, 388.
26. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10–19
(1990); 1 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 3:3.
27. See Bernstein, supra note 25, at 388.
28. 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1) (2012); 49 C.F.R. § 573.6(a)–(b) (2012).
29. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8).
30. 49 U.S.C. § 30120(a)(1)(A); Snyder Comput. Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 13
F. Supp. 3d 848, 859, 865 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
31. Snyder Comput. Sys., 13 F. Supp. 3d at 865.
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a defect’s root cause more undesirable than recalling inexpensive products
in similar circumstances.32 Indeed, product defects can create a tension
between a motor vehicle manufacturer’s engineers and lawyers: engineers
may wish to either await further testing that will yield a definitive
explanation of the defect or characterize the defect as nonsafety related,
while the lawyers may be inclined to push for a recall to limit potential civil
liability.33
A general information reporting system requires manufacturers to report
information to the NHTSA. Unlike in the securities context, where
typically lawyers prepare disclosure statements necessary for access to the
securities markets, no all-encompassing disclosure statements need be filed
before putting a motor vehicle on the market.34 Information reporting is
comprehensive and systematic and appears to entail reporting entities
exercising only somewhat modest discretion. Such reporting involves
producing original documents rather than drafting statements about the
product.
Congress considerably enhanced the requirements for manufacturer
reporting after the Ford/Firestone scandal.
While some of the
enhancements targeted failures to include data on vehicle or tire failures
abroad, the reporting requirements were enhanced even for vehicles in use
domestically.
Under the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation Act35 (“TREAD Act”) and its
implementing regulations,36 manufacturers must provide a wealth of
information, including notice bulletins, consumer advisories,
communications regarding consumer satisfaction campaigns, technical
services bulletins, and any other safety-related documents provided to
dealers.37 Manufacturers must also provide information regarding deaths
and injuries, property damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty
claims, and field reports. Unlike in civil litigation, and unlike preparation
of SEC filings, lawyers do not appear to play a central role in the provision
of TREAD Act data or in recall decisions.38
32. See 2 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 6:109; Krulwich, supra note 24, at 763.
33. Krulwich, supra note 24, at 763–64.
34. Manufacturers must certify to distributors and dealers that the vehicle complies with
all federal motor vehicle standards. 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (2012); see MICHAEL J. KEATING &
THOMAS H. CASE, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:30 (2015).
35. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170. The Act was adopted to address two deficiencies with
regard to the Ford/Firestone deaths: first, NHTSA’s lack of critical data, and second, its
inability to employ available data to spot product defects. H.R. REP. NO. 106-954, at 7
(2000).
36. Reporting of Information and Documents About Potential Defects; Defect and
Noncompliance Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 18136 (Apr. 15, 2003).
37. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(m)(3)(c); 49 C.F.R. § 579.5 (2014); see ANTON R. VALUKAS,
REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION
SWITCH RECALLS 32 (2014).
38. For example, at GM the TREAD Act responses were signed by Gay Kent, Director
of Product Investigations during much of the period relevant to the Cobalt defect. See, e.g.,
Letter from Gay P. Kent, Dir. of Prod. Investigations, Gen. Motors Corp., to Christina
Morgan, Chief, Early Warning Division, Office of Defects Investigation Enforcement,

1904

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

II. THE COBALT IGNITION SWITCH AND GM’S RESPONSE
On February 7, 2014, GM recalled approximately 780,000 Chevrolet
Cobalts and Saturn Ions due to a defective ignition switch. Drivers could
inadvertently turn the car’s ignition from “run” to “accessory,” killing the
engine and deactivating the car’s airbags. The announcement capped an
eleven-year odyssey in which GM engineers failed to identify and remedy
the defect. Approximately 124 deaths and 274 injuries have been attributed
to the defect.39
GM’s in-house lawyers have been harshly criticized for their role in
GM’s deficient response from several quarters,40 including Anton Valukas,
who investigated GM’s actions on behalf of GM’s Board of Directors. At
least five in-house lawyers were ultimately asked to leave the company,
including William Kemp, GM’s chief in-house regulatory compliance
lawyer.41 GM’s outside counsels for products litigation have received little,
if any, criticism.
GM’s legal department contained separate groups responsible for
products liability litigation and safety compliance.42 Products liability
claims were handled by in-house products liability attorneys until litigation
commenced, at which point GM retained outside counsel.43 GM required
outside counsel to provide a preliminary report on potential liability and
GM’s in-house lawyers held “roundtable”
subsequent updates.44
discussions at which settlements up to $2 million could be approved.45
Claims between $2 million and $5 million could be approved by the
Settlement Review Committee46 (SRC). Only settlements greater than $5
million required General Counsel approval.47
In an August 3, 2004, memo, GM’s then-General Counsel advised the
legal staff to elevate certain issues to superiors.48 In deciding upon the
NHTSA (Apr. 6, 2006) (on file with author). No in-house counsel served on GM’s threeperson committee that decided on recalls.
39. GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS RESOLUTION FACILITY, DETAILED OVERALL
PROGRAM STATISTICS—REVISED
(2015),
http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/
docs/Program_Statistics_8162015.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZL-HQTY].
40. The critics include members of Congress. See, e.g., Examining Accountability and
Corporate Culture in Wake of the GM Recalls: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 113th Cong. 22–
23 (2014) (statement of Sen. Blumenthal); Rena Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”:
Why Not Jail For Auto Executives?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 443, 460–61 (2015); Peter J.
Henning, How G.M.’s Lawyers Failed in Their Duties, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (June 9,
2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/how-g-m-s-lawyers-failed-in-their-duties/
?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X8G8-96CG].
41. Bill Vlasic, In Surprise, Top Lawyer at G.M. Sets Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/business/michael-millikin-gms-top-lawyer-isretiring.html [https://perma.cc/ZHS5-WDHJ].
42. VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 104–05.
43. Id. at 105.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 107.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 109–10.
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appropriate response to a regulatory violation, the attorney was to consider
the violation’s seriousness, the danger to others, and his own degree of
knowledge, level of experience, and position at GM.49 Attorneys were
advised to report to the General Counsel if their superiors were not
appropriately addressing the issue.50
GM began developing a new ignition switch in the late 1990’s.51 GM
had specifications for the torque needed to turn the key in the ignition.52 If
the key turned too easily, drivers could inadvertently turn the car’s ignition
from “run” to “accessory,” causing a loss of power, i.e., a “moving stall.”53
Even more seriously, accidentally turning off the car would disable the car’s
airbags. Though the new switch failed GM’s specifications, engineer
Raymond DeGiorgio approved it nevertheless.54 The switch was used
starting with 2003 Ions and 2005 Cobalts. DeGiorgio approved a switch
modification that increased the torque needed to turn the key in 2006.55
The modified switch was installed in some 2007 Cobalts and all later model
Cobalts.56 However, DeGiorgio neither created a unique part number for
the modified switch nor advised others of the change.57 As a result,
investigators dismissed the ignition switch as the source of seemingly
anomalous air bag nondeployments because later model year Cobalts did
not suffer such nondeployments.
GM’s response to the ignition switch defect can be divided into phases.
In the first, GM became aware that Cobalts were subject to moving stalls
due to inadvertent pressure on the ignition key. However, GM officials did
not consider the problem safety related.58
The moving stall problem was the subject of a 2004 report, which
identified the low-torque ignition switch as the source of the problem.59
GM’s Current Production Improvement Team (CPIT), primarily consisting
of business people and engineers, assessed the urgency of the problem.
Instead of designating the switch a Level 1 problem, i.e., a safety problem,
the CPIT classified it as a Level 3 problem, a “moderate” issue that requires
attention on the next dealership visit or entails moderate cost, inter alia.60
Such matters are considered less urgent, and cost is a factor in crafting an
appropriate response.61
In February 2005, GM issued a preliminary information alert advising its
dealers of the issue. The alert urged dealers to notify customers of the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 25, 34.
Id. at 35–40.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 98.
See id. at 99, 102.
Id. at 100–02. But see id. at 102 n.417.
See id. at 33, 53–54.
See id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63–64; see id. at 41–42.
Id. at 64; see id. at 69–71.
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potential for moving stalls and advise them to “remove unessential items
from their key chain[s].”62 The CPIT ultimately concluded that there was
no “acceptable business case” for fixing the ignition switch problem.63
GM’s Product Investigations Unit, the engineers responsible for safety
issues, decided against recalling the ignition switch in late 2005, opting for
issuance of a Technical Service Bulletin (TSB), which offered customers
plug inserts to ameliorate the ignition switch problem.64 However, the TSB
was drafted to avoid using the word “stall,” a “hot” word GM avoids using
in TSBs, as such “hot” words may create customer concern and draw the
NHTSA’s attention.65 Though GM produced over 10,000 plug inserts, only
430 customers requested them; Valukas noted the minimal likelihood that a
customer would become aware of the need for and availability of the plug.66
While “moving stalls” would seem to qualify as a safety defect,67 the
industry appears to have disagreed.68 Indeed, in 2007, the NHTSA set forth
a multifactor approach for determining whether stalling constituted a safety
issue.69 Nevertheless, the conclusion that “moving stalls” are unrelated to
safety seems contrary to the standards reflected in the admittedly sparse
case law and prior recall practice.70
The GM legal department’s receipt of reports regarding airbag
nondeployment, beginning in late 2005, began a second phase of the Cobalt
story.71 At the time, neither the engineers nor the lawyers understood the
connection between the ignition switch and the airbag failures. However, a
Wisconsin state trooper and a team of Indiana University researchers made
the connection.72 In a February 2007 report regarding a fatal Cobalt

62. Id. at 92.
63. Id. at 69.
64. See id. at 88.
65. Id. at 92–93. The initial draft of the bulletin included the word “stall,” but Product
Investigations excised the word. A later decision to refer to the engine’s deactivation as a
“stall” was inexplicably never implemented. See id. at 120.
66. Id. at 93–94. Even when Cobalts were brought to dealers in response to a different
recall, dealers did not install the “plug inserts.” Id. at 139. Ironically, at least one of the
Cobalts involved in a fatal airbag nondeployment had been brought to a dealer in response to
a power steering recall. Id. at 149–50.
67. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INADEQUATE DATA AND ANALYSIS UNDERMINE
NHTSA’S EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AND INVESTIGATE VEHICLE SAFETY CONCERNS 12 (2015);
VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 88; Christopher Jensen, Salamis, Key Rings and GM’s Ongoing
Sense of Humor, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 26, 2005, at F1.
68. Valukas cited only Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Mich. 2002). VALUKAS,
supra note 37, at 72 n.280.
69. Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,973 (Dec. 28, 2007). The
factors included: the frequency of stalling, the speeds at which it occurs, the type of
operation that produces it (e.g., starting, accelerating), the ease of restarting the vehicle, the
stall’s effects on steering functions, and any resulting crashes. Id.
70. See Kevin M. McDonald, Judicial Review of NHTSA-Ordered Recalls, 47 WAYNE L.
REV. 1301, 1336 (2001); Letter from Clarence M. Ditlow, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Auto Safety, to
the Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Transp., at 7–8 (June 9, 2014),
http://www.autosafety.org/sites/default/files/imce_staff_uploads/Scovell%20Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NM3Q-P4WA].
71. See VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 103.
72. Id. at 115–17, 121–24.
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accident, the state trooper, relying on reports accessible on the NHTSA’s
website regarding Cobalt moving stalls and GM’s TSB, attributed the
airbag’s nondeployment to the ignition switch problem.73 GM included the
report in its quarterly TREAD Act submission.74 An April 2007 Indiana
University Transportation Research Center report on the same accident also
attributed the airbag’s failure to the defective ignition switch.75 The
NHTSA-commissioned report appeared on the agency’s website.
The NHTSA was aware of both the ignition switch and airbag
deployment problems but, like GM, considered them unrelated. The
ignition switch never gave rise to an investigation.76 The NHTSA took the
airbag failures more seriously. In November 2007, the NHTSA’s Defect
Investigation Panel considered opening an investigation of Cobalt/Ion
airbag nondeployments. However, the panel ultimately decided against
doing so, under the misconception that the airbag failures could be
explained by the drivers’ failure to wear seatbelts and the vehicles’
departure from the roadway during the accidents.77 In April 2009 and
February 2010, the NHTSA’s Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) looked
into Cobalt crashes, but failed to investigate fully the airbag
nondeployments.78
Meanwhile, Cobalt crashes began coming up at GM legal department
roundtables. In September 2006, the roundtable approved a settlement in a
case involving an inexplicable airbag nondeployment.79 Roundtables
approved two more airbag nondeployment settlements in 2008. The
failures in each case were attributed to an unknown “sensing system
anomaly.”80
In October 2010, GM’s legal department received its first warning from
outside counsel regarding potential punitive damages liability. King &
Spalding warned that a significant plaintiff’s verdict was likely “under these
unusual circumstances in which an apparent malfunction (sensing system
anomaly) prevented airbag deployment.”81 Moreover, the law firm
continued, the circumstances surrounding the Cobalt sensing system
anomaly “could prove fertile ground” for a punitive damages award.82 In
January 2011, in-house products liability attorney Jaclyn Palmer presented
a proposed settlement to the SRC, which approved it. Palmer’s superior
and Lucy Clark Dougherty, General Counsel for GM North America,
indicated that several of the lawyers wanted to meet to discuss the sensing
anomaly.83 However, the meeting did not occur until July.84
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 121–23.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 67, at 25.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
See VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 112–13.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 146–47.
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At the July meeting, the legal department told the Product Investigations
Unit that Cobalt nondeployment cases represented a safety concern and that
discovery of the malfunction’s “root cause” was urgent.85 Douglas
Wachtel, Senior Manager of Product Investigations, expressed reluctance to
take on the issue, but appeared to relent.86 Wachtel assigned engineer Brian
Stouffer to investigate. Such investigations were expected to be completed
within forty days, but investigators suffered no adverse consequences for
missing that deadline.87 Moreover, the engineer was expected to determine
the “root cause” of the problem before making recommendations.88
After a March 2012 follow-up meeting initiated by Palmer, Kemp
promised to seek out an “executive champion” to oversee the investigative
process.89 But in April 2012, before Kemp had secured a “champion,”
another outside counsel, Eckert & Seamans, noted the likelihood of legal
liability and the risk of a punitive damages award for yet another Cobalt
crash.90 In May 2012, a member of GM’s Executive Field Action Decision
Committee (EFADC), the committee that authorizes recalls, agreed to serve
as the champion for the Cobalt investigation. In mid-May, Kemp organized
a meeting of high-level managers and directors to discuss the Cobalt
problem.91
GM’s legal department apparently first became aware of the Indiana
study in June 2012, when an expert report by Erin Shipp, a plaintiff’s
expert, referenced it.92 Shipp’s report attributed the anomalous airbag
failures to the ignition switch defect. Stouffer and other engineers
dismissed Shipp’s theory because it failed to explain the problem’s
disappearance in later model Cobalts.93 At a July 25 roundtable, Palmer
explained Shipp’s theory and reported outside counsel’s view that GM
would lose the case. A junior and recently hired in-house counsel, Nabeel
Peracha, asked why the Cobalt had not yet been recalled. The other
roundtable participants explained that GM’s engineers were “acutely
aware” of the problem but could not fix it.94 According to Valukas,

84. Id. at 147–48.
85. Id. at 150. A month before the meeting would take place, King & Spalding warned
of GM’s potential liability in yet another case. See id. at 149.
86. Valukas reported that Wachtel did not recall attending the meeting. Id. at 152 n.684,
153.
87. Id. at 289–90.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 164–65.
90. Id. at 167–69.
91. Id. at 171–72.
92. Id. at 180–82. Prosecutors and GM would later agree that GM’s reporting obligation
arose during this time period at the latest. Statement of Facts ¶ 115, United States v.
$900,000,000 in U.S. Currency, No. 15 Civ. 07342 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015), ECF No. 1
(Exhibit C to General Motors Deferred Prosecution Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to
Complaint). Perhaps, given the high burden of proof in establishing criminal liability,
prosecutors were particularly generous in arriving at that date.
93. VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 185.
94. Id. at 184.
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Peracha “got the sense from the other lawyers that they had done everything
[they] could do.”95
Stouffer continued working on the Cobalt issue. Among other things, he
asked DeGiorgio again if the ignition switch had been changed, and
DeGiorgio reiterated that it had not. Product Investigations engaged the
Red X team, GM’s master problem solvers. At the same time a group of
engineers discussed options, including increasing the torque on the ignition
switch and redesigning the sensors so that airbags would deploy even when
the car was in accessory mode.96
Meanwhile, yet another Cobalt nondeployment involving an August 12,
2012, crash was the subject of a case evaluation by Eckert & Seamans. In
an October 31 memo, the firm noted that the case involved an airbag
nondeployment typical of those “GM ha[d] seen [] in a few other
matters.”97 The legal department approved a settlement at its December 12
roundtable.98
Product Investigations continued to investigate and hold brainstorming
sessions regarding possible solutions.99 Ultimately, in February 2013,
Stouffer pronounced the investigation “stuck”100 and asked that Subbaiah
Malladi, GM’s top engineering consultant, be consulted.101
But matters took a turn during an April 29, 2013, deposition,102 initiating
a third phase of the Cobalt story. Plaintiff’s counsel confronted DeGiorgio
with photographic evidence of the Cobalt ignition switch’s modification.
GM’s in-house lawyer, Ronald Porter, drove to the deposition site to
retrieve the photographic evidence. Three days later, King & Spalding’s
Philip Holladay, who had defended DeGiorgio’s deposition, recommended
to Porter and Kemp that GM hire Malladi, because the airbag
nondeployment investigation needed to reach “closure without delay.”103
On July 30, 2013, Malladi briefed Porter, Kemp, and outside counsel on
his findings, namely that the switches installed in the 2005 to 2007 Cobalts
did not meet GM’s torque specifications.104 Porter presented the case that
led to GM’s discovery of the ignition switch change to the SRC in August
2013. The SRC authorized a $5 million settlement.105
In November 2013, Stouffer concluded, anticlimactically, that the
ignition switch had caused the airbag nondeployments. Shortly thereafter,
GM began its formal multistage internal process for commencing a
95. Id.
96. Id. at 186–90.
97. Id. at 190.
98. Id. at 190–91.
99. Id. at 193, 195.
100. Id. at 196.
101. Id. Kemp encountered resistance in obtaining approval from GM’s Chief Engineer
due to cost concerns; Kemp sought to have Malladi appointed by GM’s outside counsel
instead. Id. at 197.
102. Id. at 199.
103. Id. at 200.
104. Id. at 205.
105. Id. at 206–07.
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recall.106 Ordinarily, a Product Investigations engineer presents his
findings informally to the Product Investigations Director, the Director of
Field Performance Evaluation (FPE), and in-house counsel, inter alia.107
Thereafter, the FPE team meets to recommend a recall or some alternative
action.
Next, the Field Performance Evaluation Recommendation
Committee (FPERC) reviews the investigation and makes a
recommendation to the EFADC. A recall requires a unanimous vote of the
three-person EFADC.108
The Cobalt recall did not follow this process; perhaps the idiosyncratic
nature of the process represented a failed attempt at expedition. The FPE
Director contemplated putting the matter on the EFADC’s November 18
agenda, but was persuaded to move the item to the December 3 agenda,
given the matter’s “complexity.”109 On December 2, 2013, two days before
he was to retire, Stouffer made a presentation regarding the ignition switch
defect to an informal group of FPERC members.110 They referred the issue
directly to the EFADC, because of the legal department’s desire to proceed
quickly.111
However, the matter was pushed back to the EFADC’s December 17
agenda.112 John Murawa, Stouffer’s replacement, presented the case for
recall. One EFADC member questioned whether the engineers had found
the “root cause” of the airbag nondeployment.113 After the meeting, in a
conversation with one of the EFADC members, the FPE Director expressed
concern about the “execution details” of the recall, arguing that “the
absolute last thing we need to do from a customer perspective is to rush a
decision, post it on the NHTSA website that we have a safety decision but
we cannot fix the customer vehicles for some period of time.”114
At this point, one EFADC member briefly advised CEO Mary Barra of
the potential recall; she advised him to “get the right data; then do the right
thing.”115 Almost simultaneously, GM’s General Counsel was first advised
of the Cobalt switch issue by Lucy Clark Dougherty.116 On January 31,
2014, after Murawa’s supplemental presentation, the EFADC authorized a
recall.117 On February 7, 2014, GM informed the NHTSA of a safety recall
of 780,000 vehicles at an estimated cost of over $32 million.118
On February 26, 2014, the NHTSA opened a civil enforcement
investigation regarding GM’s delay in disclosing the ignition switch

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 211.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 217.
Statement of Facts, supra note 93, ¶ 102.
VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 215–16.
Id. at 216.
Statement of Facts, supra note 93, ¶ 103.
VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 218.
Statement of Facts, supra note 93, ¶ 104.
VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 221.
Id.
Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 224.
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defect.119 On May 16, 2014, the NHTSA and GM entered into a consent
decree resolving those proceedings.120 GM admitted its violation of the
Highway Safety Act’s five-day reporting requirement and agreed to pay $35
million in penalties.121
Federal prosecutors entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with
GM on September 16, 2015.122 The prosecutors did not identify any
TREAD Act reporting violations, but did allege, and GM admitted, that GM
had “overshot” the Highway Safety Act five-day reporting requirement by
twenty months.123 In addition, prosecutors and the company agreed that in
light of GM’s response to the Cobalt defects, GM’s representations to the
NHTSA during meetings on October 22, 2012, and November 7, 2013,
were false and thus violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001.124
The course of events described above, in light of other motor vehicle
defect scandals, suggest that motor vehicle manufacturers often do not act
aggressively with respect to safety defects despite what appear to be
considerable incentives to do so. Strict products liability would appear to
give motor vehicle manufacturers strong incentives to find and remedy
safety defects in their products. Indeed, given the potential liabilities, inhouse and outside counsel might appear to be particularly strong advocates
for addressing automotive defects.
Strict products liability is designed to maximize the incentives for
manufacturers to reduce product dangers. With respect to GM’s lawyers,
those incentives proved insufficient, but not entirely ineffectual. Despite
GM’s significant exposure to compensatory, and indeed punitive, damages
(not to mention civil penalties under the Highway Safety Act), GM delayed
for years in advising consumers of the danger or correcting the defect in its
Cobalts, and its lawyers did not treat the issue with sufficient urgency.
However, products liability law did result in at least GM’s lawyers—
outside counsel and in-house products liability attorneys—prodding
engineers to identify and correct the problem and pressing for a recall. And
even William Kemp, GM’s chief regulatory compliance lawyer, made
substantial efforts to move the investigation into the airbag nondeployments
forward.
III. REGULATING ATTORNEYS TO ADDRESS
MOTOR VEHICLE DEFECT SCANDALS
The Cobalt tragedy has spawned several reform proposals. Some see
enhancement of the NHTSA’s monitoring capabilities or augmentation of
119. Consent Decree ¶ 9, TQ14-001, NHTSA Recall No. 14V-047 (May 16, 2014).
120. See generally id.
121. See generally id.
122. See generally Statement of Facts, supra note 93.
123. Id. ¶ 115.
124. Id. ¶¶ 79–81, 97–98. GM represented that the average time between identification of
a problem and a recall was 160 days in 2008 and that the average had dropped to eighty-four
days in 2012. The November 2013 statement was made to assuage concerns expressed by
NHTSA’s ODI Director regarding GM’s delayed response to safety defects. Id. ¶¶ 95, 97.
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penalties for noncompliance as the most efficacious response.125 Others see
precluding secret settlements of products liability cases as a means of
enhancing vehicle safety.126 Some reform efforts seek to encourage
“whistleblowing,” offering a bounty to encourage employees to report
defects to the NHTSA.127 Despite the criticisms of GM’s in-house counsel,
no major proposal focuses on motor vehicle manufacturers’ in-house
counsel.
Lawyers’ provision of advice and laxity in monitoring compliance is
particularly likely to facilitate corporations’ regulatory violations. The
NHTSA might consider enhancing the recall process, which largely
depends on automobile manufacturers’ compliance efforts, by promulgating
standards for lawyers counseling engineers and business executives
regarding potential safety defects. This part discusses the merits of such an
approach. First, the question of an agency’s authority to reach lawyer
conduct must be tackled. Thereafter, the question of whether an agency
should add regulation of attorneys to its regulatory repertoire can be
addressed.
A. Can the NHTSA Regulate Lawyers?
In general, Congress has not explicitly granted federal agencies authority
to regulate lawyers.128 In his seminal study, Michael P. Cox observed that
“[e]xcept for the few agencies with express authority to promulgate rules
and discipline attorneys for violation,” the authority to do so must be
implied.129 Indeed, the Agency Practice Act allows individuals to select
any member of a state bar in good standing to represent them in agency
proceedings.130 Nevertheless, the Agency Practice Act’s text and the
legislative history suggest that Congress did not intend to preclude agencies
from disciplining lawyers for conduct that threatened the “order . . . and
integrity of agency proceedings.”131
125. The Department of Transportation has sought dramatic increases to the civil
penalties for failure to report defects and the NHTSA’s budget. See, e.g., Grow America Act,
H.R. 2410, 114th Cong. §§ 4101, 4110 (2015).
126. Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014, S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014); see Request for
Public Comments on NHTSA Enforcement Guidance Bulletin 2015-01, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,046
(Sept. 21, 2015); Press Release, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, For Bad Actors Seeking to Seal
Court Documents, Blumenthal, Graham, Hope to Permit Sunshine (May 20, 2014),
http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/for-bad-actors-seeking-to-sealcourt-documents-blumenthal-graham-hope-to-permit-sunshine
[https://perma.cc/Q6K4YRFV].
127. Motor Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act, S. 304, 114th Cong. (2015).
128. Typically, lawyers’ professional conduct is regulated by state bar authorities.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, reporter’s notes. Congress
could surely preempt such state authority. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
129. Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal Agencies, 34
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 198 (1984).
130. 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (2012).
131. See Cox, supra note 129, at 198–200, 204 & n.139, 214 n.178; see 5 U.S.C.
§ 500(b). Section (d)(2), which provides that the Agency Practice Act does not “authorize or
limit the discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appear in a representative
capacity before an agency,” was understood to permit a continuation of many agencies’
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1. Gonzalez v. Oregon and Loving v. IRS
Two major cases, Gonzalez v. Oregon132 and Loving v. IRS,133 suggest
that an assertion of jurisdiction over lawyers’ conduct when participating in
product recall decision making might be subject to a successful challenge.
Gonzalez involved the Attorney General’s assertion of authority over the
practice of medicine. The Supreme Court acknowledged the federal
government’s constitutional authority to regulate medical practice, despite
the traditional state control over the subject.134 However, the Court
rebuffed the Attorney General’s argument that the Controlled Substances
Act allowed him to preclude doctors from prescribing drugs to terminal
patients to end their lives. Given the traditional state regulatory powers
over medical practice, the Court was unwilling to assume such an
expansion of federal authority over medical practice without a clear
expression of intent.135 As a matter of “commonsense,” the Court noted,
“the background principles of our federal system . . . belie the notion that
Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas
traditionally supervised by the States’ police power.”136
In Loving, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the IRS’s express
statutory authority to “regulate the practice of representatives of persons
before the Department of the Treasury”137 allowed the IRS to regulate paid
tax preparers. Despite the agency’s invocation of Chevron deference,138 the
court concluded that the statute did not authorize the IRS to regulate tax
preparers.139 The court gave six reasons for its conclusion, but only two are
critical for our discussion.140 First, tax preparers could not be considered
“representatives” of taxpayers, because tax preparers have no power to bind
their clients. The court distinguished assisting a taxpayer from representing
a taxpayer. Second, to “practice” before an agency involves work only in
connection with an “investigation, adversarial hearing, or other adjudicative
proceeding.”141 The court considered preparing tax returns fundamentally
exercise of disciplinary authority of lawyers who appeared before them. See, e.g., Letter
from Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. James
O. Eastland, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 10, 1963) (appendix to H.R.
REP. NO. 89-1141, as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4170) (observing that many agencies
“exercise disciplinary authority, such as suspension or disbarment from practice before them,
where attorneys have engaged in misconduct before them” and that the Department of
Justice understood that the proposed statute did not modify that authority); S. REP. NO. 89755, at 5 (1965) (observing that “if matters of ethical misconduct are brought to the attention
of the agencies, adequate tools are at their disposal” because the proposed statute
“specifically provides that the agencies shall lose none of their rights to discipline or bar
attorneys”).
132. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
133. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
134. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 270–71.
135. Id. at 270.
136. Id. at 274.
137. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1014 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012)) (emphasis added).
138. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
139. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1015.
140. Id. at 1016–21.
141. Id. at 1018.
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distinguishable from preparing for an agency adjudication and acting as an
advocate during that proceeding.142 It noted that the act of filing a tax
return does not initiate any adversary proceeding. If the IRS disagrees with
the tax return, the tax preparer is not invited to present arguments or engage
in advocacy; instead, the IRS conducts its own ex parte, nonadversarial
assessment of the taxpayer’s liability. Only when a “return is selected for
an audit, or the taxpayer appeals the IRS’s proposed liability adjustments,
does a taxpayer designate a representative.”143 The tax preparer may be
“practicing” in assisting with preparation of the tax return, but that does not
constitute practice before the IRS.144
2. The NHTSA’s Context
Like other agencies, the NHTSA has inherent power to regulate lawyers
who practice before it. But what does that mean in an area, like motor
vehicle safety, that lies at the intersection of civil justice and regulation?
Three groups of lawyers played a role in GM’s Cobalt response (and
would probably play a role in any manufacturer’s response to vehicle
defects): outside products liability counsel, in-house products liability
counsel, and in-house compliance counsel. Of the three, the first seems
furthest afield from the core of the agency’s inherent authority to regulate
those who practice before it.
Outside products liability counsel
unquestionably practice before the state and federal courts in which they
litigate product defect cases. They are subject to the obligations imposed
by those tribunals and subject to control by state disciplinary authorities. It
is difficult to construe defending a products liability case as “practic[ing]”
before the NHTSA.145 Indeed, such an approach would extend beyond the
capacious approach the SEC has adopted in its Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations—those regulations expressly exempt advocacy and
investigative counsel from the duty to report up “evidence of a material
violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty” by the company or
its agents.146 And the role of the courts raises either separation of powers
142. Id. (“The Federal tax system is basically one of self-assessment, whereby each
taxpayer computes the tax due and then files the appropriate form of return along with the
requisite payment.”).
143. Id.
144. The Treasury statute specified that those who practiced before the agency had to
demonstrate each of four types of competencies, including the “competency to advise and
assist persons in presenting their cases.” Id. The court concluded that preparing a tax return
clearly fell outside the definition of “presenting a case.” Id.
145. See Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of
Lawyers, 2003 PROF. LAW. 15, 23–24; cf. Jill Evans, The Lawyer As Enlightened Citizen:
Towards a New Regulatory Model in Environmental Law, 24 VT. L. REV. 229, 290 (2000)
(observing, in discussing potential EPA regulation of environmental attorneys, that “many
contacts occur directly and continuously between the [environmental attorney’s] client and
the agency” and that “compliance with environmental requirements does not necessarily
require ‘practice’ before the EPA”).
146. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(6)(ii) (2016); see Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6308 (Feb. 6, 2003). For criticism of this
exception see Cramton, supra note 9, at 775–79. The SEC’s exemption is also consistent
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or federalism issues. To the extent that the NHTSA’s exercise of authority
would interfere with defending a products liability action, it might interfere
with the operation of the federal courts, creating a separation of powers
concern.147 The federalism concerns resemble those raised in Gonzalez, as
control over lawyer conduct traditionally lies within the purview of state
licensing and disciplinary authorities.
Similar arguments can be advanced with regard to in-house products
liability counsel. Though they may not make appearances in court, such
attorneys primarily provide support and guidance for civil litigation and
address claims in anticipation of civil litigation. At least GM in-house
products liability lawyers do not appear to make NHTSA filings.148
Arguably, under Loving, even compliance lawyers do not “practice”
before the NHTSA. In at least one critical respect, in-house compliance
counsel’s role resembles that of tax preparers’. Like the tax system, the
product-recall system is based largely on self-reporting. The Loving court
relied heavily on the self-reporting nature of the tax system in finding that
tax preparers did not “practice” before the IRS. In effect, like the tax
preparer, compliance lawyers for motor vehicle manufacturers assist in a
self-reporting process that essentially precedes any form of agency process.
The decision to initiate a recall is often an initiative of the regulated entity,
not the result of interactions with the NHTSA. The Cobalt recall ultimately
involved GM’s own identification of the defect and provision of notice and
a remedy to the public.
However, the Loving court’s approach is arguably too artificial in the
motor vehicle safety context. The NHTSA’s ODI did contemplate opening
an investigation into the airbag nondeployment issue; indeed, its failure to
do so can be attributed to negligence.149 ODI and GM were also engaged in
discussions regarding the safety implications of “moving stalls.” Moreover,
GM’s 2005 TSB was crafted to avoid the NHTSA scrutiny. Thus, the line
between self-reporting and “agency proceedings” is problematic. While the
NHTSA’s mandatory recall authority has fallen into disuse, voluntary
recalls are merely an alternative to the NHTSA recall proceedings.150
The application of another Loving factor is somewhat ambiguous in the
motor vehicle context. Loving emphasized tax preparers’ lack of authority
to bind taxpayers, concluding that tax preparers do not “represent” the

with Model Rule of Professional Conduct § 1.13(d). Comment 7 explains that § 1.13(d)’s
exemption of certain lawyers from certain disclosure obligations “is necessary in order to
enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an
investigation or defending against a claim.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt.
7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
147. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545–46 (2001) (finding that
congressional limitations on representations by the Legal Services Corporation interfered
with the functioning of the federal courts).
148. Granted given the broad definition of “claim[s]” in the NHTSA’s TREAD Act
regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 579.4 (2014), in-house counsel probably provide information for
inclusion in TREAD Act reports.
149. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
150. 2 GOODMAN, supra note 16, § 6:3.
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taxpayer. In-house compliance counsel presumably can make binding
representations on behalf of the company. However, unlike in the typical
adversarial proceeding, other GM officials communicating directly with
NHTSA officials can also bind the company.151 The lawyers appear to lack
the sort of control in asserting the client’s position that lawyers traditionally
hold in the prototypical adversarial proceeding at the core of the typical
federal agency’s authority to regulate practice before it.
Yet another obstacle to the assertion of jurisdiction over vehicle
manufacturers’ lawyers’ compliance counseling may be the TREAD Act,
which seems to embody a distinctly different approach from that taken in
Sarbanes-Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley clearly embraced lawyer-specific SEC
regulations as an essential component of the regulatory regime.152 The
TREAD Act includes no similar mandate. Instead, Congress appears to
have embraced an alternative approach, namely that automakers provide
sufficiently comprehensive information to enable the NHTSA itself to
identify vehicle defects and encourage, or if necessary order, automakers to
recall defective vehicles.153
Finally, any reporting out requirement may fundamentally restructure the
lawyer-client relationship. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,154 the
Court found a fundamental restructuring of the lawyer-client role
unconstitutional even when the restrictions on Legal Services lawyers were
related to government funding of legal services for private individuals.155
While there may well be no First Amendment or other constitutional
problem with a reporting out provision in the motor vehicle defect context,
Velazquez may suggest caution nonetheless. Where a restriction is imposed
by the government not as a part of its control over its own expenditure but
in its capacity as a regulator, a court could well demand that Congress
clearly express its intent to allow the agency to regulate in such a way.
In short, the NHTSA’s authority to regulate compliance lawyers’ advice
on the necessity and timing of a recall is questionable, at least absent clearer
legislative authorization.
3. Two Early 2000’s Abortive Agency
Attempts to Regulate Lawyers
Though agencies often maintain systems for exerting “institutional
control” over lawyers participating in adjudications,156 two quite modest

151. Cf. Evans, supra note 145, at 290 (finding significant direct contact between a
lawyer’s client and a regulator in the context of discussing potential EPA jurisdiction over
environmental lawyers’ client counseling).
152. Pub. L. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245
(2012)); Cramton, supra note 9, at 727–28.
153. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-954, at 7 (2000).
154. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
155. Id. at 543 (“[T]he Government seeks to use an existing medium of expression and to
control it [in ways which] distort its usual functioning.”).
156. David B. Wilkins coined the term “institutional controls,” referring to specific
government institutions “expressly taking responsibility for uncovering and sanctioning” the
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efforts to extend regulation of attorneys beyond the context of
administrative adjudication in the early 2000’s both resulted in an agency
retreat.
In 2000, the CPSC sought to expand its jurisdiction over lawyers to cover
attorney conduct outside of the context of formal adjudication.157 The
CPSC explained that it conducts most of its business “outside of
adjudicatory proceedings,” offering as examples negotiation with attorneys
during an investigation or inquiry regarding a product or with respect to a
voluntary corrective action plan for products or civil penalties.158 The
proposed rule covered “regulatory matters or any other activities between
attorneys . . . and a [CPSC] Commissioner or [CPSC] staff acting in their
official capacities.”159 The CPSC made clear that an attorney need not
engage in actual contact with a CPSC official for the rules’ prohibitions to
apply.160 The CPSC ultimately terminated its rulemaking.161
The NHTSA does not seem to have expanded its jurisdiction in the way
the CPSC contemplated.162 Indeed, in implementing the TREAD Act,
which requires vehicle manufacturers to report on vehicle safety claims, the
NHTSA has carefully avoided intruding upon the province of outside
counsel. Reportable safety claims would include lawsuits. However, the
NHTSA excludes from its definition of field report, which must be
provided to the NHTSA, any document “covered by the attorney-client
privilege or the work product exclusion.”163 Moreover, it does not require
vehicle manufacturers to obtain from their outside counsel information
sufficient to identify a claim in litigation. The manufacturer need merely
“attempt to obtain the missing minimal specificity information” from
outside counsel.164
Agencies can seek to regulate clients’ obligations related to legal
representation. The proposed alternative to the noisy withdrawal rule, i.e.,
requiring a company to report a lawyer’s withdrawal, exemplifies such an
approach. The FCC’s revision of its rules for representations to the FCC
also illustrates this potential approach.

misconduct that work “either directly in, or in the shadow of, state institutions.” David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 807 (1992).
157. Standards of Conduct for Outside Attorneys Practicing Before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,515, 66,516 (Nov. 6,
2000).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Despite the potential to interpret the caveat broadly, the CPSC appears to have
contemplated a narrow interpretation that covered, for example, knowing destruction of a
document relevant to a staff investigation. Id.
161. Standards of Conduct for Outside Attorneys Practicing Before the Consumer Product
Safety Commission; Termination of Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 20,356 (Apr. 25, 2003)
(explaining that it had “evaluated the comments and has decided the proposed attorney
conduct rules are not necessary”).
162. 49 C.F.R. § 511.76 (2014).
163. Reporting of Information and Documents about Potential Defects; Defect and
Noncompliance Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,136, 18,138 (Apr. 15, 2003).
164. 49 C.F.R. § 579.28(d) (emphasis added).
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Section 1.17 of the FCC’s regulations provided that “[n]o applicant,
permittee or licensee shall in any response to [FCC] correspondence or
inquiry or in any application, pleading, report or any other written statement
submitted to the [FCC], make any misrepresentation or willful material
omission bearing on any matter within the jurisdiction of the [FCC].”165 In
February 2003, the FCC sought to expand the rule in four ways.166 First,
the revision would prohibit even negligent misstatements or omissions.167
Second, it would more clearly encompass statements made to the FCC in all
contexts,168 including unsolicited voluntary submissions and statements
made during investigatory proceedings.169 Third, the revised rule would
include oral statements.170 Fourth, the provision was to apply to “all
persons making statements to the [FCC] (e.g., including nonregulatees).”171
The Federal Communications Bar Association argued that applying the
rule to lawyers would “potentially interfere with the attorney-client
relationship by giving the attorney an incentive to disregard the client’s
wishes to protect the attorney,” inter alia.172 In response, the FCC
refocused the regulations on actual or potential FCC licensees, revising it to
exclude “non-regulatees,” such as attorneys communicating with the FCC.
Attorney misrepresentations would be attributed to the licensee rather than
the lawyer.
B. Should the NHTSA Regulate Lawyers?
Even if the NHTSA can regulate counsel’s regulatory compliance advice,
should it? An agency like the NHTSA might consider several types of
issues in deciding whether to do so. In particular, an agency should assess
and evaluate the potential rationales for regulating lawyers’ conduct, the
aspects of the legal practice context that might impact the efficacy of any
such regulatory efforts, and potential alternatives (including imposing
obligations on regulated entities) less likely to intrude upon the attorneyclient relationship.
1. The Rationales for Regulating Compliance Lawyers
An agency might regulate lawyers: (1) to ensure that those entitled to a
government benefit receive it, particularly when beneficiaries may be

165. 47 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2000) (amended).
166. Amendment of Section 1.17 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Truthful
Statements to the Commission, 17 FCC Rcd. 3296, 3297 (Feb. 14, 2002) (notice of proposed
rulemaking).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Amendment of Section 1.17 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Truthful
Statements to the Commission, 18 FCC Rcd. 4016, para. 13 (Mar. 4, 2003) (final rule).
170. 17 FCC Rcd. at 3297.
171. Id.
172. 18 FCC Rcd. 4016, para. 15.
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unsophisticated; (2) to protect the integrity of its own processes; and (3) to
help restrain regulated entities.
Under the first rationale, the regulation of lawyers—often to ensure
competence—furthers the interests of the government programs’
beneficiaries. Thus, regulating tax preparers could, in part, ensure that
taxpayers, particularly unsophisticated ones, receive the benefits they
deserve while not being victimized by those providing assistance. Perhaps
regulation of patent lawyers could be justified on similar grounds. This first
rationale has little relevance to the regulation of motor vehicle
manufacturers’ lawyers. Sophisticated clients have ample ability to protect
their own interests vis-à-vis their legal representatives.173
The second rationale, protecting the integrity of the agency’s own
processes, could justify the NHTSA’s jurisdiction over legal practice.
Ensuring the veracity and accuracy of the information regulated entities
submit as well as access to information about safety hazards goes to the
heart of the integrity of the NHTSA’s processes. In the Cobalt case,
however, this rationale does not appear to be implicated; GM’s TREAD Act
disclosures appear to be in substantial compliance with the Act’s
requirements.
Under the third rationale, an agency might employ the regulation of
compliance attorneys as one tool to attain its regulatory goal of constraining
regulated entities to protect those endangered by their actions. The
NHTSA, for example, might impose obligations on regulated entities’
lawyers to better protect the public from dangerous products.174 Lawyers’
advice, both with regard to initiating recalls or lesser remedial actions and
compliance with reporting requirements, may have implications for the
public’s safety. Particularly given the NHTSA’s heavy reliance on motor
vehicle manufacturers’ self-reporting as well as their initiation of voluntary
recalls, public safety is particularly implicated in the Cobalt scandal. The
agency’s public safety goals are probably consistent with those of the
regulated entity to the extent that the conduct required of the regulated
entity is clear, a strong monitoring and enforcement system exists, and the
magnitude of the penalties provide appropriate incentives.175
Unfortunately, all three conditions rarely coexist.
2. The Legal Practice Context
In deciding whether and how to regulate lawyers, agency officials must
understand the role that lawyers play in the particular area of law, i.e., the
legal practice context. Such knowledge is critical to any assessment of the
potential effectiveness of enlisting lawyers as gatekeepers. An agency

173. Wilkins, supra note 156, at 824–31.
174. Id. at 819–20 (distinguishing risk to clients (“agency problems”) from risks to third
parties (“externality problems”)).
175. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 56–57 (1986).
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contemplating such a course should consider at least the following five
questions:
(1) When are lawyers consulted and how heavily do company
officials rely on their advice?
(2) Are penalties for noncompliance reduced based on a “mistake of
law” or a corporate official’s “good faith” reliance on an
attorney’s advice?
(3) Are actors legally prohibited from proceeding on a course of
action without receiving formal concurrence from counsel? If
not, can the agency create a meaningful concurrence
requirement?
(4) To what degree do lawyers serve a “rule avoidance” function?
That is, how often and to what extent do they structure or
characterize actions in light of the applicable legal rules so as to
obtain clients’ objectives while complying with the law?
(5) To what extent can actors “shop around” for a lawyer who will
provide the opinion the actor seeks?
With respect to the first question, if the field is one in which actors
frequently either do not consult or do no rely upon lawyers, imposing
requirements on lawyers may do little good.
With respect to the second question, while “ignorance of the law” is
generally no excuse, in some contexts, “ignorance of the law” or reliance on
“advice of counsel” may serve to mitigate, or perhaps even excuse,
regulatory violations.176 For example, in the securities field, a reliance-oncounsel “defense” might be available.177 The defense may apply only to
violations that require scienter.178 To establish the defense, the defendant
must establish that that he “(1) made a complete disclosure to counsel;
(2) requested counsel’s advice as to the legality of the contemplated action;
(3) received advice that it was legal; and (4) relied in good faith on that
advice.”179 In some areas, the actor may be able to assert ignorance of the
law even without consulting counsel.180
Ignorance-of-the-law defenses, particularly if they require seeking advice
of counsel, would increase the need to regulate lawyers’ provision of
advice. By providing legal advice, the lawyer would give the regulated
entity sufficient comfort to pursue a course that it might otherwise be
176. See Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 341–58 (1998).
177. See Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2009); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 665
F.2d 1310, 1314 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard, Reliance
on Advice of Counsel As a Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 19–
37 (1976).
178. Thomas C. Frongillo et al., “Late Trading” of Mutual Funds: Chinks in the Armor
of the Regulators’ Claim That It Is Illegal Per Se, 10 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 1,
16–17 (2004).
179. See Savoy Indus., 665 F.2d at 1314 n.28.
180. Davies, supra note 176, at 357–58 & n.70–72.
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disinclined to take (or, indeed, might be willing to take only on the basis of
supportive legal advice). Thus, addressing the lawyer’s conduct may
significantly diminish the number of regulatory violations, depending on
how clearly the law reflects regulators’ view of actors’ compliance
obligations. It is unclear whether advice of counsel would serve to mitigate
a civil penalty under the Motor Safety Act, which does not appear to have a
scienter requirement.
The third question focuses on the existence, or potential to create, “gates”
for lawyers to keep. In some circumstances lawyers are natural gatekeepers
due to the nature of the process in which the client is involved.181 Lawyers
can interdict unlawful conduct where the conduct cannot proceed without
their explicit approval.
Accountants and lawyers may be natural
gatekeepers for certain securities transactions that cannot be closed without
formal audits or opinion letters.182 In other circumstances, the agency
perhaps can structure the processes regulated entities must pursue, so that
lawyers can act as gatekeepers.183
The fourth question focuses on the degree to which lawyers serve a ruleavoidance role. In some areas, lawyers frequently structure transactions to
conform to legal requirements while providing many of the benefits the law
sought to withhold.184 Lawyers often seem to function in this way in legal
fields involving financial transactions, such as in tax law or securities law.
The structuring and characterization of transactions can be critical in these
areas. But lawyers may play such a role less regularly in other areas,
particularly those not governed by highly structured rules. Flexible
standards do not lend themselves to avoidance strategies.185 Rule
avoidance may not be central to motor vehicle compliance lawyers’ work.
Though the NHTSA has promulgated some motor vehicle safety standards,
few rules constrain motor vehicle design; rather the presence of a defect
turns on the application of a broad calculus-of-risk standard. The greater
the lawyers’ rule avoidance role, the more critical it is to regulate lawyers
practicing in that area.
The fifth question requires the agency to assess the regulated entity’s
opportunity to “shop around” for a lawyer. Imposing gatekeeping
responsibilities on lawyers will be less successful if the regulated entity can
“shop around” for lawyers who will “bless” a desired course of action.186
One can envision a company changing outside counsel due to counsel’s
unwillingness to affirm the legality of its desired actions. Corporate
officials may face a bit more difficulty in seeking to “shop around” for
malleable in-house counsel, given the disruption caused by terminating a
permanent employee and training a new one. Of course, reporting up
181. See Kraakman, supra note 175, at 54.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Zoë Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 693, 704–06 (2010).
185. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 133 (1996).
186. See Kraakman, supra note 175, at 71–74.
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within the legal department, or even a system of hierarchical control and
clear areas of responsibility, would help diminish the ability of lower-level
officials to shop around for a member of the legal department willing to
affirm the legality of a desired course of action.
3. Possible Approaches
The NHTSA might consider: (1) imposing reporting up or reporting out
requirements, or (2) imposing a requirement that regulated entities obtain
formal concurrences from lawyers before making certain decisions.
Reporting up obligations assist lawyers’ clients, but not necessarily
regulatory beneficiaries. Reporting up obligations directly serve two related
functions. First, they establish a supplemental monitoring system that
provides high-level executive officers and the board with information and
leverage they can use to rein in wayward subordinates inclined to perpetrate
crimes or frauds.187 Secondly, reporting up obligations help align power
with responsibility, ensuring that those who have the power to control
corporate conduct cannot shirk their responsibilities by denying knowledge
of potentially unlawful conduct.188 Thus, the requirement largely serves to
protect the interests of corporate constituents (i.e., the management, board,
and shareholders) and facilitate corporate governance.
Indirectly, reporting up may lead to greater compliance. The more
widespread the knowledge of a potential unlawful course of action, the less
likely that course of action will be pursued, particularly over lawyers’
objections. Moreover, executive officers and board members may bring a
broader perspective to the issue than the lower-level official contemplating
the unlawful action. Such executive officers and board members are better
positioned to ensure that effective action is taken to address the breach.
But reporting up obligations will surely leave many compliance problems
unresolved. Reporting up does not ensure that the General Counsel’s, the
high-level executive officers’, and board’s view of the applicable regulatory
requirements is congruent with the agency’s. Indeed, the more ambiguous
or indeterminate the legal requirements, the more likely such a divergence
will emerge.189 For example, it is not clear that reporting up would have
lead GM’s leadership to reject the view, common among the GM lawyers
and engineers, that a recall should await determination of a root cause.

187. Indeed, In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996), imposed on directors an obligation to establish some form of system for
monitoring legal compliance.
188. The reporting up that was done in the Cobalt case proved to be critical in terms of
the prosecutor’s findings that the corporation was criminally liable. Statement of Facts,
supra note 93, ¶ 115 (“This [culpable] knowledge extended well above the ranks of
investigating engineers to certain supervisors and attorneys at the Company—including
GM’s Safety Director and the GM Safety Attorney.”).
189. And, of course, deficiencies in agency monitoring or inadequate penalties may mean
that reporting up does not successfully prevent unlawful corporate actions.
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Similarly, reporting up may well not have changed GM’s determination that
moving stalls were unrelated to safety.190
The NHTSA may lack the expertise to impose meaningful professional
standards for in-house counsel regarding corporate regulatory compliance
with the Highway Safety Act. The appropriate actions are surely highly
dependent on the structure and culture of the particular corporation and may
not easily be amenable to fixed or determinate rules.
Unlike reporting up, reporting out enhances the agency’s monitoring
capabilities. Agencies could defend imposition of such an obligation on inhouse compliance lawyers as consistent with Model Rule 1.6, though Rule
1.6 generally reflects the view that reporting out is a matter of conscience,
not legal obligation.191 Proposing a reporting out obligation would embroil
the NHTSA in vigorous, long-standing arguments within the legal
community regarding lawyers’ duties of loyalty and confidentiality.
Viewing regulated entities’ lawyers as potential agency-monitoring
resources that can assist agency efforts to protect regulatory beneficiaries
arguably implicitly conceives of such lawyers as “agents” of the
administrative agency, at least in part. Such a conception seems somewhat
inconsistent with the traditional client-focused view of the lawyer’s role, in
which the lawyer primarily seeks to enable clients to protect their interests
and attain their goals, advising them on how to do so within the bounds of
the law (or that they cannot do so consistent with the law).192 Under such a
view, lawyers do not serve to augment regulators’ enforcement resources.
As noted earlier, the implicit conception of lawyers as supplemental
resources for agencies could easily be viewed as fundamentally altering the
attorney-client relationship, much as the restraints on Legal Services
Corporation lawyers were viewed as altering the attorney-client relationship
in Vasquez.
In addition, legal scholars and lawyers have long debated whether
requiring attorney disclosure of corporate client’s regulatory transgressions
will discourage those clients from confiding in lawyers. The SEC’s “noisy
withdrawal” proposals produced broad opposition in the legal community,
in part based on an argument that clients would be less willing to confide in
lawyers.193 Several scholars in legal ethics have argued to the contrary.194
An agency would be hard-pressed to rely on its “expertise” in defending its
resolution of such issues.
190. Indeed, GM’s Board was briefed on the GM-NHTSA discussions regarding the
standard for determining safety defects. VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 239.
191. The Model Rules do not preclude agencies from requiring a lawyer to disclose
information about a client; Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits such disclosures when necessary to
comply with the law. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013);
accord id. r. 1.6 cmt. 12.
192. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548 (1995) (“The traditional
understanding is that lawyers as professionals act for the client’s benefit in providing that
access to the law. Under this understanding, lawyers do not function as law enforcement
officers or as judges of their clients in providing knowledge of the law.”).
193. 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (Feb. 6, 2003); Zacharias, supra note 145, at 20 n.32.
194. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 9, at 814–17.
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In any event, alternative means of increasing monitoring resources may
be equally effective and avoid requiring legal professionals to act in tension
with the core professional value of protecting client confidences. Congress
could increase incentives for whistleblowers. Though Congress has already
provided job protection for whistleblowers revealing motor vehicle safety
defects,195 Congress could, as some have proposed, offer bounties to
potential whistleblowers.196 Such whistleblowers would not be bound by
confidentiality obligations akin to those that constrain lawyers. Thus,
whistleblowers would report out in lieu of the lawyer being obligated to
breach confidentiality by reporting out.
The NHTSA could establish requirements for attorney certification, to
ensure that corporate officials must consult with and obtain approval from
lawyers before taking action.197 The Valukas report does not clearly
describe GM’s in-house lawyers’ role with respect to some key decisions,
such as the decision to classify the ignition switch problem as a customer
convenience issue and the decision use a TSB drafted in innocuous
language. The nonlawyers’ conclusion that the ignition switch did not
present a safety issue delayed GM’s response for years. The decision to
issue a TSB that downplayed the defect led to the failure to inform
consumers of the initial “fix” GM had adopted. Each of these decisions had
legal ramifications and could have benefited from lawyers’ expertise. The
question of whether the ignition defect is “safety related” is a legal question
that GM’s regulatory lawyers were grappling with on a broader level.
Questions about the content, design, and delivery of a product warning
frequently arise in products liability “warning defect” cases, where often the
key question is the adequacy of a product warning.198 The decisions made
regarding the initial characterization of the ignition switch defect and the
handling of the TSB may well have been different had there been greater
lawyer involvement. Imposing a legal certification requirement would
ensure in-house counsel’s involvement in such decisions. Such a
requirement would, for example, require decision makers to secure a
certification from counsel that a defect is not safety related or that a
decision to use a TSB in lieu of a recall and the TSB’s design and content
are reasonable in light of the danger presented. Not only would such a

195. Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405, 765 (2012) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30171
(2012)).
196. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act, S. 304, 114th Cong. (2015).
197. See Kraakman, supra note 175, at 54, 57.
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c), cmt. i (AM. LAW
INST. 1998) (“No easy guideline exists for courts to adopt in assessing the adequacy of
product warnings and instructions. In making their assessments, courts must focus on
various factors, such as content and comprehensibility, intensity of expression, and the
characteristics of expected user groups.”); 1 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN &
DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9:12 (4th ed. 2014) (“In most warning defect claims where
a warning has been given, the critical inquiry will be whether the warning and instructions
given were adequate to inform the user or consumer of the nature of the risk. The question
of adequacy is, therefore, central to most warning defect claims.”).
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certification requirement assure legal counsel’s involvement, it would also
make counsel accountable for such decisions.199
However, a certification requirement would compel the agency to
confront potential incongruities between compliance lawyers’ and the
agency’s views of the applicable legal constraints. Agencies should expect
lawyers’ advice to diverge from the advice agencies would find optimal.
While compliance lawyers might take a broad pro-consumer approach to
the question of what constitutes a safety defect, the NHTSA should not
expect them to do so as a matter of professional obligation.200
Any of the above regulatory approaches—mandatory reporting up,
mandatory reporting out, and establishing a certification regime—would
require the agency to create a disciplinary system. Establishing a
disciplinary system is particularly critical if the agency adopts a
certification regime, so that the agency could punish lawyers who
unreasonably provided certifications.
A disciplinary system would
presumably prove costly201 and might divert the agency’s focus from the
condition and operation of motor vehicles or the responsibility of the
corporation to questions about the conduct of the company’s lawyers.
4. Restraining Regulated Entities, Not Lawyers
Rather than regulating lawyers, Congress or the NHTSA might add
precision to the obligations of motor vehicle and component parts
manufacturers. First, the NHTSA or Congress could address the dilemma
facing manufacturers when they conclude a defect exists but cannot
immediately determine its root cause. Second, the NHTSA could provide
much clearer guidance for determining when a defect is “related to safety.”
The Cobalt airbag failures provide an example of a safety-related defect
whose cause GM could not immediately ascertain. GM’s in-house lawyers
appeared to accept the proposition that a recall could not be initiated until
GM could remedy the defect. Much of the delay in responding to the
ignition switch defect was due to the perceived need to await the engineers’
identification of the problem’s root cause. However, such an approach
ignores the Highway Safety Act’s requirement that the company must offer

199. Such certification requirements could easily be phrased as requirements that must be
met by the regulated entity and thus would not run afoul of Loving.
200. Evans, supra note 145, at 295 (“Under the somewhat amorphous regulatory
gatekeeper model, the lawyer conceivably would be expected to consider the broad goals
sought to be achieved by the environmental statutes and to advise clients not on the best way
to avoid or minimize the expense of compliance, but rather on courses of action consistent
with the purposes of the statutes regardless of whether those goals mirror those of the
client.”).
201. See Michael A. Perino, SEC Enforcement of Attorney Up-the-Ladder Reporting
Rules: An Analysis of Institutional Constraints, Norms and Biases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 851,
853–57 (2004). Moreover, agencies running disciplinary systems punishing lawyers’
conduct in agency proceedings, or more generally for conduct that undermines agency
processes, are always subject to allegations of bias. See Arthur Best, Shortcomings of
Administrative Agency Lawyer Discipline, 31 EMORY L.J. 535, 583 (1982); Cox supra note
129, at 225.
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a refund if it cannot remedy a safety-related defect. Certainly immediately
announcing the safety defect without a means to remedy it would be a
substantial financial burden on the manufacturer, but the Highway Safety
Act does not appear to allow manufacturers to delay the defect notification
process on such a basis.
However, even from the consumer perspective, there are reasons
manufacturers should not act with undue haste.
Acting without
understanding the root cause of a performance anomaly might mean that the
remedy provided will prove deficient. This could give consumers a false
sense of security and require a second recall.202 In the Cobalt case, it might
have resulted in a recall of insufficient or excessive scope. An early recall
might have been too broad because it might have been conducted before
GM realized that later-model Cobalts contained a modified ignition switch.
As it was, the initial recall was too limited; GM twice had to expand its
scope.203 Moreover, a recall before the manufacturer has parts available to
remedy the problem can frustrate car owners.204
Notifying individuals of a recall without offering a remedy or a refund
could allow customers to minimize their risk. But when the malfunction is
a mysterious “sensing anomaly” preventing airbag deployment, how can the
car owner lessen the risk? Most consumers might simply have to cope with
a heightened concern about a safety risk they cannot diminish. Perhaps
acknowledging the manufacturers’ dilemma and allowing them a specified
period to devise a remedy might produce more expeditious action than the
current approach.
The test for determining whether a defect is safety related, namely
whether the defect poses “an unreasonable risk of accidents or injuries,”205
is indeterminate and undeveloped. In making the relevant determination,
three factors must be weighed: “(1) the severity of the harm it threatens;
(2) the frequency with which that harm occurs in the threatened population
relative to its incidence in the general population; and (3) the economic,
social, and safety consequences of reducing the risk to a so-called
‘reasonable’ level.”206 Even with respect to moving stalls, which would
appear to be an obvious safety problem, the NHTSA’s approach turns on
[t]he rate at which stalling occurs . . ., the speeds at which stalling occurs,
the type of operation during which stalling occurs (e.g., when starting,
accelerating, decelerating, or cruising), [how quickly] the vehicle can []

202. See Christopher Jensen, Nissan May Repeat Recall Over Airbags, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 2015, at A23.
203. VALUKAS, supra note 37, at 225–26.
204. More than five months after the recall was announced, GM consumers experienced
frustration in obtaining the needed repairs expeditiously due to supply bottlenecks. See
Examining Accountability and Corporate in Wake of the GM Recalls: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety & Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. &
Transp., 113th Cong. 86–87 (2014).
205. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d. 400, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1555, 1578 (D.D.C. 1987)).
206. Id. at 410.
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be restarted, . . . whether the stalling affects steering [or braking]
functions, . . . and any crashes or other unsafe events.207

Moreover, due to the prevalence of voluntary recalls, the governing case
law is dated—the latest major case was decided in 1988. Thus,
manufacturers enjoy a great deal of discretion in determining which defects
are “related to safety.”
CONCLUSION
The Highway Safety Act makes identifying and remedying defects highly
dependent upon manufacturers’ and components parts makers’ own
initiative. The NHTSA lacks, and is unlikely to receive in the near future,
sufficient enforcement resources to comprehensively perform such a task.
It is natural to look to the automakers’ lawyers to secure manufacturers’
compliance with their Highway Safety Act obligations. While safety
should not be solely their responsibility, lawyers can surely be expected to
be the primary proponents of regulatory compliance. It is thus sensible to
explore whether the NHTSA can impose compliance obligations on the
auto industry’s lawyers. Ultimately, however, such an approach would
expand the NHTSA’s jurisdiction in a controversial way that Congress does
not appear to have contemplated. And neither the NHTSA nor Congress
has exhausted the other options for ensuring that the voluntary recall system
properly protects the public from motor vehicle defects.

207. See Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,973 (Dec. 28, 2007);
see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.

